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AbStrACt: This issue brief describes coverage, cost-sharing, and financial protection for pri-
mary care and prescription drugs in Denmark, England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden. Very few patients report unmet need for care or find general practitioner care 
unaffordable. Although none of the six countries spends more than 11 percent of gross domes-
tic product on health care, compared with 16.2 percent in the United States, they are able to 
provide a level of access to and financial protection for primary care and prescription drugs 
that far exceeds what is available in the U.S. Several have focused recently on adapting cost-
sharing design to reflect value by reducing user charges for highly effective care, preventive 
care, accepting referral to specialist care, adhering to clinical guidelines, and enrollment in dis-
ease management programs. These innovations, and others described in the brief, could help 
inform U.S. policies for national health insurance reform.
                    
OvErviEw
Health insurance functions to ensure access to health care and to protect people 
against the high cost of illnesses and poor health. Making individuals with insur-
ance pay something at the point of use—commonly known as cost-sharing—can 
undermine access and financial protection, particularly for poorer people and those 
with long-term chronic conditions. At the same time cost-sharing can provide incen-
tives aligned with value. For example, a health plan or system can use cost-sharing 
to encourage people to select lower-cost care when choices exist between equivalent 
options and discourage inappropriate or less-effective treatment choices.
This issue brief reviews coverage and cost-sharing for primary care and pre-
scription drugs in six European countries (Denmark, England, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden) to identify insights for policy reforms and insurance design 
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in the United States.1 The six countries were selected for 
review because although they spend significantly less per 
person on health care than the U.S. (Exhibit 1), their 
health system outcomes are generally similar to or often 
better than those in the U.S., and in recent years they 
have improved faster on key indicators. For example, 
the rate of deaths from causes that can be prevented 
by timely and appropriate health care has fallen mark-
edly over time in the United Kingdom, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and France, but has decreased by a much 
smaller amount in the United States (Exhibit 2).
The European countries also were selected to 
demonstrate a range of approaches to insurance design, 
primary care organization, and cost-sharing. Denmark, 
England, and the Netherlands have a long tradition of 
patient registration with local general practitioners (GPs) 
in return for free access to primary care. In contrast, 
France, Germany, and Sweden require patients to pay a 
fee to see the doctor and allow them to visit specialists 
without a GP’s referral. In all three of these countries, 
cost-sharing policy is designed to encourage patients to 
visit a GP before seeing a specialist. The charge for spe-
cialist care is lower if patients obtain a referral from their 
primary care provider. The European approaches offer a 
valuable comparison to the U.S. system, where cost-shar-
ing is widely applied, mainly to control health care costs, 
but typically with little regard to the value of services.2
HEAltH CArE COvErAgE
The European countries illustrate different models 
of health care financing and organization, but pub-
lic finance dominates in every country (Exhibit 3). In 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the taxes used to 
finance health care (often referred to as social insurance 
contributions) are mainly levied on employment. The 
health system is organized around membership in health 
insurance funds, using a single-payer system in France 
and competing payers in Germany and the Netherlands. 
In Denmark, England, and Sweden, taxes to finance the 
health system tap a broader revenue base, including non-
wage sources of income. The health system is organized 
around local entities (single payers) responsible for a geo-
graphically defined population.
In spite of these broad differences, all the coun-
tries aim to ensure universal coverage and access to a uni-
form package of benefits within a regulatory framework 
established by the national government (Exhibit 4). In 
each country, there is a long tradition of commitment to 
principles such as solidarity and access to health care on 
the basis of need, rather than ability to pay. Adherence to 
these principles has recently been strengthened in France 
and Germany with a move away from employment-based 
access to health care, toward universal coverage based on 
residence. 
In most of the countries, residents are automati-
cally covered by the statutory system. Germany and 
the Netherlands are exceptions; residents are required 
Exhibit 1. Total Spending on Health per Capita (in US$ PPP), 2007
US dollars
Notes: PPP = Purchasing power parity—an estimate of the exchange rate required to equalize the 
purchasing power of different currencies, given the prices of goods and services in the countries 
concerned. DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; FR = France; NL = The Netherlands; SE = Sweden; 
UK = United Kingdom; US = United States.
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Health Data 2009 
(Paris: OECD, 2009).
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Exhibit 2. Deaths from Causes That Can Be Prevented 
by Timely and Appropriate Health Care (per 100,000 people), 
1997–98 and 2002–03
Note: DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; FR = France; NL = The Netherlands; SE = Sweden; 
UK = United Kingdom; US = United States.
Source: E. Nolte and M. McKee, “Measuring the Health of Nations: Updating an Earlier Analysis,” 
Health Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2008 27(1):58–71.
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to enroll with a health insurance fund to obtain cover-
age, but few people (less than 3% of the population) go 
without coverage.3 In each of these countries, primary 
care and prescription drugs are an essential part of the 
national benefit package, which covers a wide range of 
preventive, diagnostic, and curative services.4
Among these six countries, Germany and France 
are the only ones in which both public and private insur-
ance play a significant role, with private insurance oper-
ating either as a substitute (Germany) or complement 
(France) to the public insurance system.5 Germany is 
unique among European countries in having a complex 
dual system of coverage, which allows people earn-
ing above a certain amount (around $69,000 per year 
for three consecutive years) to choose between public 
and private insurance. Among higher earners, private 
insurance is generally cheaper than public insurance for 
younger people in good health with no dependents. The 
covered population falls into three categories: compul-
sorily covered by public insurance because of income 
(74%), voluntarily covered by public insurance (around 
14%), and covered by private insurance (around 10%).6
Those who opt for private insurance in Germany 
can only return to the public scheme if their earnings fall 
below the threshold and they are under 55 years old. If 
they are 55 or older, they are locked into private cover-
age.7,8 For this reason, people age 55 and older with pri-
vate insurance have guaranteed access (open enrollment) 
to a basic policy.9 In contrast to other private policies, the 
basic policy provides lifetime coverage, with a benefits 
package similar to the public benefits package, for a pre-
mium that cannot exceed the maximum contribution for 
public insurance and must not reflect health risk (beyond 
adjustment for age and gender).
In France, private voluntary insurance comple-
ments public insurance, similar to Medigap policies that 
Medicare beneficiaries purchase in the U.S. It reimburses 
patients for cost-sharing in publicly financed health care 
and covers about 92 percent of the population. Voluntary 
insurance is mainly obtained through employers, but 
since 2000 the government has provided low-income 
households, around 7 percent of the population, with 
free private insurance through the Couverture Maladie 
Universelle-Complémentaire (CMU-C) scheme.10 The 
income threshold for CMU-C ranges from $9,887 for a 
single-occupant household to $24,718 for a household 
with five people. 
Private voluntary insurance in Denmark provides 
about 30 percent of the population with access to ser-
vices not covered by the national benefit package, such as 
dental care and physiotherapy, as well as Medigap-style 
coverage for prescription drug cost-sharing.11 In the 
Netherlands, about 92 percent of the population has pri-
vate voluntary insurance covering dental care and physio-
therapy. In England and Sweden, private voluntary insur-
ance covers a much smaller proportion of the population 
(10% and 3%, respectively) and mainly facilitates faster 
access to elective surgery and specialist consultations.12
 UK  SE  DK  DE  US FR NL
Exhibit 3. Sources of Health Care Finance, 2006
Note: DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; FR = France; NL = The Netherlands; SE = Sweden; 
UK = United Kingdom; US = United States.
Source: World Health Organization, WHO Statistical Information System: Health System Resources 
(Geneva: WHO, 2009), cited Feb. 24, 2009, available at: 
http://www.who.int/whosis/data/Search.jsp?indicators=[Indicator].[HSR].Members.
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Exhibit 4. Health Care Coverage, 2007
Note: DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; FR = France; NL = The Netherlands; SE = Sweden; 
UK = United Kingdom; US = United States.
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Health Data 2009
(Paris: OECD, 2009).
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PrimAry CArE COvErAgE, bEnEFitS, 
AnD COSt-SHAring
In England, Denmark, and the Netherlands, primary 
care is generally provided by GPs, who often work with 
nurses. In France, Germany, and Sweden, primary care is 
provided by a mixture of GPs and outpatient specialists, 
such as pediatricians, general internal medicine physi-
cians, and gynecologists. Patients in Sweden also have 
access to nurse-led clinics. In all six countries, patients 
may choose their primary care provider, although in 
Denmark, England, the Netherlands, choice is restricted 
to area of residence. In France, Germany and Sweden, 
patients also can choose among office-based specialists 
and do not need referrals from their GPs. England and 
the Netherlands require patients to register with GPs who 
are responsible for referrals to specialists, while France 
and Germany offer patients reduced cost-sharing if they 
register with a regular doctor (most patients do) and 
obtain referrals to specialist care. The registering doc-
tor usually holds the patient’s medical records and takes 
responsibility for coordinating the patient’s care and 
referrals to specialist care. This differential cost-sharing 
was introduced recently (in 2005 in France and in 2007 
in Germany) as part of a policy reform to strengthen pri-
mary care and coordination.
The range of services to which patients have 
direct access (without referral) varies across countries, but 
patients in the six countries generally have coverage for 
a similar and broad basket of preventive, diagnostic, and 
curative care in nonhospital settings.13 In all the coun-
tries, benefit design emphasizes access to primary and 
preventive care, with a variety of cost-sharing arrange-
ments (Table 1). Steps to minimize financial barriers to 
obtaining primary care include:
making primary care free for everyone, with no •	
copayments or other cost-sharing (Denmark, 
England, the Netherlands);
making all outpatient care free for children •	
(including specialist visits), with no copayments or 
other cost-sharing (all countries except France);
keeping cost-sharing for primary care low: a visit •	
to a GP or specialist (without extra billing)14 costs 
the patient about $9 in France, about $13 in 
Germany, and between $12 and $36 in Sweden;
exemptions from cost-sharing for people with •	
chronic conditions (France);
exemptions from cost-sharing for people who •	
enroll in disease management programs (some 
health insurance funds in Germany);
exemptions from cost-sharing for people with low •	
incomes (France);
annual caps on out-of-pocket spending (Germany, •	
the Netherlands, Sweden);
providing Medigap-style private insurance to •	
people with low incomes (France);
charging patients lower fees to see a GP than a •	
specialist (Sweden); and
charging patients lower fees for outpatient doc-•	
tor visits if they register with a regular doctor and 
obtain referrals to specialists (Denmark, France,15 
Germany).
 As a result of these measures, the most anyone 
pays out-of-pocket in a year for publicly financed pri-
mary care—including visits to office-based specialists but 
excluding prescription drugs—ranges from nothing in 
Denmark and England to $56 in Germany (if patients 
accept referral requirements for seeing specialists), $109 
in Sweden, and $199 in the Netherlands. There is no cap 
on out-of-pocket spending for the general population 
in France, but people with chronic conditions and those 
from poorer households do not have to pay more than 
about $66 per year for health care, including prescription 
drugs.16 Germany caps total out-of-pocket spending as a 
share of income, with a lower threshold for chronically ill 
people. Thus, financial protection for the general popula-
tion is very high in five of the six countries; in the sixth 
country, France, there is a high level of financial protec-
tion for chronically ill people and those from poorer 
households.
Levels of financial protection are much lower 
for privately insured people in Germany and may be 
undermined by extra billing in France and Germany. The 
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privately insured in Germany are frequently subject to 
cost-sharing in the form of coinsurance or deductibles. 
In 2009, the government capped the level of deductibles 
for private insurance at $6,640 per year after research 
showed that deductibles had increased steadily between 
2001 and 2005 and older people were more likely to have 
higher deductibles than younger people.17,18 Also, doc-
tors in Germany can extra bill privately insured patients 
and are allowed to charge them more than twice as much 
as they charge publicly insured patients.19 Some doctors 
in France (around 30% of specialists and 10% of GPs) 
are allowed to bill all patients, except those covered by 
CMU-C, up to 20 percent more.20
PrESCriPtiOn Drug COvErAgE AnD  
COSt-SHAring
The publicly financed benefits package covers prescrip-
tion drugs in each of the six countries. Drugs provided 
in the hospital are free for all patients. Patients usually 
have to pay a share of the cost of drugs provided outside 
the hospital, but the level of cost-sharing is generally low 
(Table 2). The Netherlands recently abolished cost-sharing 
for prescription drugs priced below the reference price. 
All the countries use clinical effectiveness criteria 
to decide which prescription drugs should be reimbursed 
under statutory insurance. This seeks to ensure that 
the public system does not pay for clinically ineffec-
tive drugs.21 Four of the countries use reference pricing 
schemes to give patients financial incentives to select 
less-expensive medications when more than one choice 
exists.22 France goes further, adapting cost-sharing levels 
to match the clinical effectiveness of different categories 
of drugs. 
The five countries that charge patients for part 
of the costs of outpatient prescription drugs have taken 
steps to exempt specific groups of people from cost-shar-
ing, including:
exemption for children under 18 years (Denmark, •	
England, Germany);
exemption for people with chronic conditions •	
(England,23 France,24 some health funds in 
Germany);
exemption for people with low income (England, •	
France);
exemption for people age 60 and older (England);•	
annual caps on out-of-pocket spending (England, •	
Germany, Sweden) and on out-of-pocket spending 
by chronically ill people (Denmark);
Medigap-style private insurance (Denmark, •	
France); and
cost-sharing based on clinical effectiveness •	
(France) and clinical effectiveness and price (refer-
ence pricing in France, Denmark, Germany, and 
the Netherlands).
As a result, almost 90 percent of outpatient pre-
scriptions in England are exempt from cost-sharing and 
there is an annual cap of $147 on out-of-pocket spending 
on drugs. In France, people with chronic conditions pay 
only $0.65 per prescription or nothing, if they are poor 
or under age 18. Annual out-of-pocket caps for drugs are 
higher in Sweden ($500) and Germany (1% or 2% of 
household income, but the cap applies to all health care 
spending and around 40% of drugs are free of charge) 
and only apply to chronically ill people in Denmark 
($678). 
The Netherlands and England, therefore, provide 
the greatest protection against the cost of outpatient pre-
scription drugs for the general population. France also 
provides a high level of financial protection for people 
with chronic conditions and, in Germany, many prescrip-
tion drugs are free of charge. Sweden is the only country 
not to exempt any group from cost-sharing.
ACCESS tO PrimAry CArE SErviCES 
AnD PrESCriPtiOn DrugS
Survey data show that very few people experience finan-
cial barriers to obtaining GP care. In 2007, fewer than 
5 percent of respondents in Denmark, England, and 
Sweden and fewer than 10 percent in France, Germany, 
and the Netherlands found GP care to be “not very 
affordable.”25 No Danish or U.K. respondents found GP 
care to be “not at all affordable;” only 1 percent of respon-
dents in the other four countries responded similarly.
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In each country, people are more likely to have 
affordability problems when visiting specialists.26 The 
percentage of respondents finding specialist visits not very 
affordable is quite low in Denmark and Sweden (5%) 
and the U.K. (10%), but much higher in the Netherlands 
(16%), Germany (23%), and France (39%).27 Fewer than 
3 percent of respondents in Denmark, Sweden and the 
U.K., 5 percent in Germany and the Netherlands, and  
9 percent in France said specialist visits are not at  
all affordable.
Other survey data show that well under 5 percent 
of the population report having any unmet need for 
health care, even among relatively poor households.28 
The exception is Germany, where about 12 percent of the 
lowest-income quintile reported unmet need for health 
care, compared with about 4 percent for the highest-
income quintile.
The affordability problems faced by some patients 
in France and Germany likely reflect three factors: extra 
billing by doctors in both countries; high deductibles for 
private insurance in Germany, especially among older 
people who are not permitted to return to the public 
scheme once they have opted for private coverage; and 
inadequate financial protection for the general popula-
tion in France (that is, those without chronic conditions 
and nonpoor households). Although 92 percent of the 
French population is covered by Medigap-style private 
insurance, the quality of private coverage varies by socio-
economic status. For example, in 2000, over 60 percent 
of people earning at least $1,620 per month had an aver-
age or high level of coverage (i.e., covering most regular 
cost-sharing and possibly some extra billing) compared 
with only 20 percent of those earning less than $810 a 
month.29 In addition, increases in cost-sharing have not 
been matched by a concomitant rise in private insurance 
reimbursement levels, which means that the degree of 
financial protection provided by private insurance has 
fallen over time.30 Thus, the French strategy of shifting 
health care costs to patients and providing subsidized pri-
vate insurance for poorer households has not succeeded 
in removing financial barriers to access, particularly for 
specialist care.
Survey data also demonstrate clear differences in 
the availability of specialists and GPs.31 In each of the six 
countries, patients are much more likely to report access 
difficulties with regard to specialists than with GPs. This 
may be due to longer waiting times to see specialists 
and because specialists tend to be concentrated in urban 
centers and not evenly distributed across the country. A 
higher proportion of patients reports problems with the 
availability of GPs in Sweden than in the other countries, 
perhaps because of shortages in GP supply. This short-
age may be reflected in the low number of doctor visits 
per year in Sweden, compared with the other European 
countries and the U.S. (Exhibit 5).32
Differences in the affordability and availability 
of GP care, compared with specialist care, have equity 
implications. More poor people than rich people use 
GPs in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom—all countries in which GP care is free at the 
point of use. GPs are equally accessible for both rich and 
poor in France and Germany.33 However, in every coun-
try except the U.K., higher-income groups use specialists 
at higher rates, which may reflect both higher cost-shar-
ing for specialist visits and an uneven distribution of spe-
cialists.34,35 Nevertheless, research also shows that income 
inequality in terms of access to doctors is less pronounced 
in the European countries than in the U.S.36
Recent analyses of need-adjusted use of medica-
tions among people age 50 and older found little or no 
 UK  SE  DK  DE  US  FR NL
Exhibit 5. Number of Annual Doctor Consultations 
per Capita, 2007
Note: Data for Sweden and the US are for 2006 and data for Denmark are from 2004.
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Health Data 2009 
(Paris: OECD, 2009).
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evidence of socioeconomic differences in Europe.37 This 
reflects widespread efforts to remove financial barriers for 
poorer households and people with chronic conditions 
through exemptions and caps on out-of-pocket spend-
ing. Comparative survey data found access issues to be 
much less prevalent in the European countries than in 
the U.S.38
COnCluSiOnS AnD POliCy imPliCAtiOnS 
FOr tHE unitED StAtES
In the European countries reviewed in this paper, cost-
sharing is much less likely to be applied across the board 
than it is in the United States. Three of six countries 
do not charge for GP visits (Denmark, England, and 
the Netherlands) and two do not charge for outpatient 
specialist visits (Denmark and England). None of the 
countries charges for drugs provided in hospitals and 
the Netherlands does not charge for outpatient prescrip-
tion drugs below the reference price. All the countries 
exempt certain groups from cost-sharing. This most often 
includes children (Denmark, England, Germany, and the 
Netherlands), people with chronic conditions (Denmark, 
England, France), and low-income households (England 
and France). In addition, most countries place caps on 
out-of-pocket spending on health care.
As a result of widespread exemptions and caps 
on patient spending, levels of financial protection for 
publicly financed primary care, including visits to office-
based specialists, are very high for the general popula-
tion in every country except France, which does provide 
a high level of financial protection for patients with 
chronic conditions. Levels of financial protection for 
prescription drugs are very high in the Netherlands and 
England, high in France for patients with chronic condi-
tions, and high in Germany for the general population. 
Denmark, France and Sweden do not provide such a high 
level of financial protection for the general population, 
although cost-sharing for drugs is capped at $500 per 
year in Sweden. In Denmark, cost-sharing is capped at 
$678 per year for people with chronic conditions. 
Very few people report unmet need for care in 
any of the six countries or face financial barriers when 
visiting GPs. Nevertheless, a significant proportion face 
financial barriers accessing specialist care in France and 
Germany, probably because of extra billing by doctors 
in both countries, high levels of cost-sharing among the 
privately insured in Germany, and inadequate financial 
protection for the general population in France. Even 
though Medigap-style private insurance is near-universal 
in France and subsidized by the government for poorer 
households, it does not provide full protection from cost-
sharing because reimbursement levels have not matched 
increases in cost-sharing over time. In addition, poorer 
people are likely to have lower-quality private coverage.
These findings lead to several conclusions and 
observations worth highlighting. First, the higher num-
ber of doctor visits per person in the European countries 
compared with the U.S. may reflect relatively low levels 
of cost-sharing for doctor visits (and prescription drugs) 
in Europe, where there is growing emphasis on access, 
continuity, and primary and preventive care.
Second, the European countries generally follow 
the principle of providing the most financial protec-
tion to those with the greatest health needs. While the 
purpose for doing so is to provide equity among the 
population, it may also have secondary effects in terms of 
efficiency—those with the greatest capacity to benefit do 
not face financial barriers to access. 
Third, several countries explicitly consider value 
when designing their cost-sharing policies. Value-based 
cost-sharing draws on evidence that shows that cost-
sharing requirements can discourage patients from using 
high-value health care.39 The European countries use 
value-based design to steer patients toward more-efficient 
patterns of health care use. This may include encouraging 
referrals to specialist care, enrollment in disease manage-
ment programs, or generic substitution for prescrip-
tion drugs. This approach is more frequently applied in 
countries where alternative policy levers to enhance effi-
ciency—such as GP gatekeeping or compulsory generic 
prescribing—are politically less feasible.
Fourth, the affordability problems experienced 
by patients in France and Germany have less to do with 
cost-sharing policy for publicly financed care (particu-
larly in Germany) and more to do with provider pay-
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ment rules and the presence of private insurance that 
substitutes for or complements public insurance.
Policymakers in the U.S. could draw insights from 
these observations, including: 
Cost-sharing design in the European countries •	
reflects a concern for equity of access to health 
care, which is likely to have positive efficiency 
effects. It increasingly reflects an explicit concern 
for enhancing value in the health system.
The European countries generally provide the •	
most financial protection to those with the great-
est health needs—people with chronic conditions, 
poorer households, and children—rather than 
allowing those individuals to experience the high-
est costs. This is achieved in a variety of ways, 
including exemptions and caps on out-of-pocket 
spending.
Various countries provide real-world examples and •	
experience in terms of redesigning cost-sharing 
policy to prevent financial barriers to high-value 
health care and to align incentives across the 
health system, so that rules governing provider 
payment do not undermine cost-sharing policy.
The variations among the countries also point to •	
the importance of paying attention to financial 
protection for those with private insurance, as 
well as public insurance. The findings suggest that 
countries should avoid relying on Medigap-style 
private insurance to protect poorer households 
from cost-sharing because differences in access to 
and quality of private insurance can exacerbate 
inequalities in access to health care.
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